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THE INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
OF MEGA-POLITICS
KAREN J. ALTER* AND MIKAEL RASK MADSEN**
I
INTRODUCTION
What happens when international courts (ICs) are asked to adjudicate highly
divisive or polarizing social or political issues? What are the consequences for the
courts themselves, for the law in question, and for politics and society when highly
contentious issues are brought before the international bar? ICs can become
involved in polarizing domestic issues that are governed by international law,
such as the rights of migrants, minorities, or religious groups. And they can
become embroiled in high-stakes international disputes, such as conflicts over
territory, over the use of military or economic coercion, or disagreements about
property and money owed.
This special issue investigates these high stakes cases under the heading of the
international adjudication of mega-politics. Ran Hirschl coined the term “megapolitics” to describe “matters of outright and utmost political significance that
often divide whole polities.”1 The definitional focus on polities distinguishes
mega-politics from the international relations category of high politics, the latter
being typically seen as national-interest and security related issues of concern to
governments, political leaders, and militaries, but not necessarily the polity more
broadly. Whereas Hirschl saw “mega-politics” cases as those where courts, both
national and international, spoke to fundamental questions that defined the
identity of a polity, we broaden the concept. In our definition, judicialized megapolitics applies whenever ICs are adjudicating legal issues that divide domestic
societies or inter-state relations such that one would anticipate that, whatever the
outcome, important and sizable social or political groups will end up greatly
upset. We include issues not only related to the identity of a polity, as in Hirschl’s
definition, but also other social, economic, and political conflicts that create
cleavages at the national and international levels across or between societies.
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International adjudicators have long been asked to decide politically sensitive
and controversial issues, some of which might be defined as mega-political.
Historically, international adjudicators focused mostly on trans-border disputes
that, while sometimes contentious, for the most part did not divide domestic
populations.2 Moreover, the requirement of case-specific consent to litigation
ensured that the litigating governments were ready to accept the international
judicial determination.
Increasingly, ICs are monitoring states’ behind the border adherence to
international commitments such as human rights treaties, laws of war, nondiscrimination, rule of law, and trade rules.3 These legal domains inherently bring
ICs more deeply into domestic social and political matters. It is also more
common today for ICs to have or claim compulsory jurisdiction for the case being
adjudicated, so government support for the case’s outcome cannot be assumed.4
The rise of nationalist sentiments and forms of political populism adds an extra
layer of controversy, leading nationalist politicians to invoke the supremacy of
democratic deliberation or sovereignty as a basis to reject even well-reasoned
rulings involving clear violations of international law. These developments mean
that international adjudication is both internationally and domestically sensitive.
We are interested first and foremost in what happens to ICs when they
become embroiled in mega-politics. At first glance, any IC involvement in megapolitics would seemingly be politically risky precisely because IC rulings are
likely to be contested and perhaps ignored. Since flagrant disregard for salient IC
rulings can undermine IC authority and diminish state support for ICs, ICs might
suffer from engaging in such cases. Yet these dangers do not always arise. Studies
of both domestic and international judicial involvement in highly contested cases
suggest that courts are sometimes empowered by high stakes cases because they
are seen as siding with the people, the rule of law, democratic will, or with
powerful local allies. One question explored in this project is the range of
institutional consequences for ICs for adjudicating mega-political disputes. These
consequences include both positive and negative effects on IC authority,5 and the
domestic and international institutional transformations that mega-political cases

2. See generally Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2005)
(stating that in the Alabama Claims the United States insisted on British compensation for intervention
on the side of the Confederacy during the U.S. civil war); Manley O. Hudson, The Corfu Channel Case:
Significance of First Ruling by Present Court, 34 A.B.A. J. 467 (1948) (describing the first case adjudicated
by the International Court of Justice, which involved Albania’s mining of the Corfu straits with Greece
that caused damage to British warships intervening in the Greek civil war).
3. KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS
120–24 (2014) [hereinafter ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
4. See generally Cesare Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791 (2007);
Mary Ellen O’Connell & Lenore VanderZee, The History of International Adjudication, OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 40 (2014).
5. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, LAURENCE R. HELFER & MIKAEL RASK MADSEN,
INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY (2018) [hereinafter ALTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COURT
AUTHORITY].
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may engender.
Secondly, as a comparative project, we are also interested in understanding
variation in these different outcomes, as well as the various strategies and ways
that ICs and stakeholders engage with fraught mega-political disputes. As a
collective endeavor, the contributions to this special issue examine a host of
empirical examples of the adjudication of mega-political issues across ICs and
subject-areas as well as different international contexts.
Thirdly, we are interested in what happens to the mega-political conflict itself;
that is, the effects of the adjudication of mega-politics on the law in question, as
well as on the social and political stakes involved in the issue. Simply put, does
international adjudication solve, mediate, exacerbate, or merely continue the
divisions in politics and societies? If the international intervention makes the
situation worse, there may be no winners and the IC may lose legitimacy, support
and, ultimately, authority. Alternatively, transferring a dispute out of domestic
or regional political arena could help local actors accept an outcome they do not
like. Our inquiry draws insight from short-term and long-term perspectives on
the consequences of the international adjudication of mega-politics to explore
the larger consequences of international judicial involvement in highly contested
issue-areas.
Fourthly, we are interested in whether ICs adjudicating mega-politics foments
backlash against ICs. Most literature on backlash against ICs focuses on how
particular IC rulings catalyze or become the focal object of backlash politics, or
they study how these rulings trigger pushback or backlash.6 By contrast, this
project examines cases that are a priori likely to generate pushback.7 In
methodological terms, the special issue is focused on the most likely cases for
backlash against ICs. As Part II will explain, Hirschl’s definition of judicialized
mega-politics pertains to the issue being adjudicated, not the ruling itself or the
politicization of a ruling after the fact. This special issue sees the combination of
a highly politicized subject-matter and international judicial intervention as
increasing the probability of an adverse political response, which is why mega6. There is a growing literature on these matters. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak
& Micha Wiebusch, Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of
Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT (2018) [hereinafter Madsen et al., Backlash
Against International Courts]; Karen J. Alter, The European Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover
or Backlash, 54 INT’L ORG. 489 (2000); Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash
Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J.
INT’L LAW 293 (2016) [hereinafter Alter et al., Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and
Southern Africa]; Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, 18 PERSP. ON
POL. 407 (2020) [hereinafter Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts]; Wayne
Sandholtz, Yining Bei & Kayla Caldwell, Backlash and International Human Rights Courts,
CONTRACTING HUMAN RIGHTS (2018). Each of these sources characterizes political backlash against
IC decisions.
7. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Resistance to the European Court of Human Rights: The
Institutional and Sociological Consequences of Principled Resistance, in PRINCIPLED RESISTANCE TO
ECTHR JUDGMENTS – A NEW PARADIGM? (Marten Breuer ed., 2019) (showing that even minor
political issues and disagreements can lead to greater principled problems and backlash, if – for a number
of contextual reasons – politicians decide to escalate their conflicts with ICs).
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politics cases are the most likely cases for backlash. We seek to better understand
why only sometimes adjudicating controversial cases and disappointing powerful
actors foments backlash.
This introductory Article to the special issue focuses on defining and
identifying the contexts that give rise to the international adjudication of megapolitics, and it theorizes about the strategies and challenges of ICs that are called
upon to adjudicate mega-political disputes. The contributors to the special issue
then address what happens to a range of mega-political disputes. Finally, the
special issue’s conclusion returns to the issue of how international adjudication
impacts mega-political disputes.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part II outlines and
defines the key tenets of the adapted concept of judicialized mega-politics. Part
III identifies structural contexts that give rise to mega-politics, identifying three
categories of cases most likely to engender mega-politics: 1) inter-state disputes;
2) social cleavage disputes; and 3) sovereignty-based disputes. Part IV discusses
the particularities and consequences of embroiling international adjudicators in
these highly contentious legal-political issues.
There are always risks when courts intervene in issues of high salience and
political significance, especially if a ruling goes against the wishes of powerful
governments. Given that ICs are likely to be less well known by local populations,
one might expect their legitimacy and authority to be even more fragile compared
to their domestic counterparts.8 This introductory Article discusses the variable
and fragile authority of ICs in general, and in light of the current nationalist
populist political moment and the particular challenges it presents.9 Overall, this
Article explains why the general phenomenon of ICs engaging mega-political
disputes is neither new nor likely to disappear.10 Part V previews the
contributions to the special issue. The special issue’s conclusion draws on the
contributions to this special issue, returning to the question of the consequences
of adjudicating mega-politics cases for the particular issue or conflict and for ICs,
on the strategies ICs employ to successfully minimize political pushback, and on
the relationship between mega-politics and backlash against ICs and

8. See James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions:
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 459 (1995)
(investigating the idea that an IC’s legitimacy is more fragile compared to its domestic counterparts); see
also James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High
Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998) (further investigating the weak legitimacy of ICs). But see
Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Power, DELEGATION
AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren Hawkins et al. eds. 2006) (showing that
retaliation against an IC can be challenging because changing legislation, court mandates, and budgets
may require building international support, and because governments may be unable to retaliate against
judges themselves).
9. See ALTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 25–27, 452–59 (explaining the challenges of building IC
authority and the fragility of this authority).
10. See generally, Karen J. Alter, The High Water Mark of International Judicialization?, iCourts
Working Paper Series, No. 250, in BY PEACEFUL MEANS: A TRIBUTE TO DAVID D. CARON
(forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Alter, The High Water Mark of International Judicialization?].
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international law more generally. Circling back to these questions leads to
disagreement with Ran Hirschl’s argument about why courts should not become
involved in adjudicating mega-politics issues.
II
ADJUDICATING MEGA-POLITICS: DEFINITIONAL QUESTIONS
This Part focuses on what defines a legal dispute as being mega-political. The
category of mega-politics was first introduced by Hirschl in his study of
juristocracy, where he critically analyzed contexts in which elites have used
higher courts to maintain their power and cement their political agendas.11 In his
analysis, mega-political questions appear as a sub-category of political and social
issues related to fundamental questions of national identity:
“In recent years, the judicialization of politics has expanded beyond rights issues or
transnational cooperation to encompass what we may term “mega-politics”—matters
of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole polities.
These range from electoral outcomes and corroboration of regime change to matters of
war and peace, foundational collective identity questions, and nation-building processes
pertaining to the very nature and definition of the body politic. Examples include the
fate of the American presidency, the war in Chechnya, the near-constant political
turmoil in Pakistan, multicultural citizenship in Western Europe, the place of Germany
in the EU, quandaries of transitional justice from the postcommunist world to
postauthoritarian Latin America to postapartheid South Africa, the status of
indigenous populations in Australia and New Zealand.”12

We take some key elements from Hirschl’s definition but revise them for our
empirical context and analytical purposes. First and foremost, we agree that
mega-politics is associated with the issue in dispute, not a court ruling itself or the
politicization of a legal controversy. Important to the proposed definition of
mega-politics is whether an issue already divides or is vocally controversial in
significant segments of society. In focusing on IC adjudication of mega-politics, it
is not important whether the preexisting divisions are longstanding or fairly
recent, so long as the fraught social nature of the subject matter at stake is
apparent, with partisans mobilized on both sides. Contemporary nationalist
populism may increase the prevalence of mega-politics because populist leaders
often polarize populations, vilify elite institutions (especially international ones),
and attack the rule of law, but the mega-politics category is larger than such
populism-inspired challenges.13 Our definition also differs from most of the

11. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 171–72 (2004) [hereinafter HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY] (noting that in
nations such as Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa, “national high courts . . .. are strongly
inclined to rule in accordance with national metanarratives and the interests and expectations of ruling
elites.”).
12. Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics, supra note 1, at 984.
13. What constitutes populism is a contested issue, but it includes a claim to speak on behalf of the
people, and a rejection of elites. Because populist leaders see themselves as embodying what the people
truly want, they generally reject efforts to check or push back against their claims and actions. See, e.g.,
JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016) (arguing that populism at its core is a rejection of
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literature on backlash, which focuses on the processes that engender
politicization of IC rulings. What matters for our object of inquiry is that the issue
is already socially divisive before an IC becomes involved or issues a ruling.
Whereas Hirschl created a single mega-political category that included
domestic and international issues, this study focuses on the international
adjudication and thus the internationalization of such disputes. The focus on the
international level reflects our broader interest in the relative fragility of IC
authority and the related IC strategies to increase their resilience. When
considering why an internationally adjudicated dispute is mega-political, we
theorize that the international adjudication of a domestic issue may in itself
engender a reflexive reaction (referred to herein as sovereignty-driven megapolitics). That said, Hirschl would surely expect that a legal ruling could be just
as polemic if it came from domestic judges. Indeed, domestic judges may
intentionally pass the legal buck to the international level, preferring to let an
outside body issue a ruling that is likely to be domestically contested. Meanwhile,
because international adjudicators operate beyond the direct political reach of
national governments, ICs may also be able to intervene in ways their domestic
counterparts cannot.14 Part III develops further the particular mega-political
issues that are likely to arise in an international adjudicatory venue.
Contrary to Hirschl, we posit that judicial involvement in mega-politics is not
necessarily harmful for democracy. Hirschl associated mega-politics with
hegemonic powers trying to lock in their agenda on fundamental questions
involving a polity’s identity. Against this backdrop, Hirschl made the case that
majoritarian political solutions were preferable ways to address mega-political
issues. Part III will address this concern. At this stage, what matters is that the
involvement of courts, national or international, in mega-political disputes is
generally an extension of rather than a counterpart to politics, which is to say that
courts are involved because partisans seek to leverage favorable legal rulings.
While the litigants’ motivation is surely political, Hirschl’s concern was that
adjudication would be used to either entrench a preferred outcome through
constitutional lock-in, or that judicial resolution would substitute for an effort to
resolve the issue politically or electorally. These are valid concerns. However,
especially from the vantage point of contemporary politics and the resurgence of
populism, it is far from evident that courts and constitutions necessarily entrench
elite power, agendas, and prerogatives. To be sure, where courts wield power,
one can expect politics to shape judicial appointment and judicial politics, and a
form of political lock-in may then follow. But there is also a need to worry that
executive branches may try to instill minority rule, weakening domestic political
pluralism); PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT, AND THE
RISE OF AUTHORITARIAN-POPULISM 4–8 (2018) (distinguishing between nationalist populism, which
mixes nationalism with populist rhetoric, and authoritarian populism, which mixes authoritarian values
(e.g., the importance of security, value of conformity, and obedience towards strong leaders) with
populist rhetoric). We focus on the nationalist side of populism because ICs are, by definition, outsiders
associated with globalist agendas.
14. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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and legal institutions to the point that neither elections, nor parliamentary
opposition, nor judges can check executive power. The intervention of ICs might
further democracy by demanding checks that in themselves compel or nudge
local partisans to find a legally defensible solution to issues that have riddled
societies.15 And where democratic institutions are dysfunctional, judicial checks
designed to uphold the constitution, individual rights, and a system of dispersed
power may well be both politically popular and democracy-enhancing.
We also note that some international judicial intervention is countermajoritarian by design. International human rights obligations are intended to
override majoritarian choice, precluding, for example, grants of amnesty for war
crimes, the use of torture, or the criminalization of homosexual behavior, even if
they run counter to dominant local sentiment. Sometimes international legal
obligations clash with national constitutional obligations, setting domestic actors
on a collision course with ICs, such as that seen in the interface of EU law and
national constitutional law.16 And sometimes the costs associated with an
international legal violation end up constraining democratic choice. For example,
developing countries may fear the consequences of a decision to grant a
compulsory license for a patented medicine or the consequences of creating
temporary market barriers to protect national producers dealing with unforeseen
market disruptions. For those who believe that human rights are worth
protecting, that accountability for mass atrocities is important, or that
international economic openness serves the long-term economic interests of
countries, using international law to constrain government and majoritarian
tendencies is precisely the point.
There are many reasons why ruling against the government is not a required
part of this definition of mega-politics. In any system of judicial review,
governments will occasionally find themselves on the losing side of litigation and
the fact that a government loses will not in itself make an issue or a legal ruling
controversial. This is especially so because sometimes politicians knowingly
support unconstitutional or illegal acts to encourage their supporters, and
sometimes these very same politicians want a court to stop the illegal acts from
turning into precedent or binding law. Also, in inter-state disputes, the chances
are certainly very high that one of the two litigant governments will be on the
losing side. Especially if the issue is not mega-political, government lawyers may
argue the position they believe to be the correct one or that has domestic backing,
yet they may also not feel particularly strongly, or they may know their case is
weak and unlikely to prevail. From an empirical perspective, it is important to
note if government opposition increases the likelihood that adjudication of mega-

15. See generally SHAI DOTHAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHEN SHOULD
INTERNATIONAL COURTS INTERVENE? (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2020) (noting
that there can be democratic failures in domestic politics, where issues affecting minority or
disenfranchised groups can be neglected in the absence of intervention by international bodies).
16. Karen J. Alter, National Perspectives on International Constitutional Review: Diverging Optics,
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 244, 249 (Erin Delaney & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2018).
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political issues leads to backlash proposals and efforts, meaning extraordinary
claims and efforts to harm the authority of an IC or provoke dejudicialization.17
Since government opposition is neither necessary nor sufficient for an issue to be
mega-political, it cannot be part of defining the phenomenon being studied here.
That said, government opposition may be a necessary element for adjudication
of mega-politics to engender dejudicialization, and it may be sufficient for, and
thus part of what defines, the overlap between mega-politics and high politics
litigation.
In sum, mega-political disputes involve substantive issues that deeply divide
societies such that one can predict that at least one important social group will be
upset by the outcome of international adjudication.
III
STRUCTURAL CONTEXTS THAT GENERATE MEGA-POLITICS LITIGATION
Our definition of mega-politics involves investigating the international
adjudication of issues that are already socially and politically divisive and
contested. Whether and to what extent a society is divided about a topic are
empirical questions that obviously can vary by social and political context and
across time and space. For example, in Israel the question of religious exemption
from military service is controversial because it touches on the fundamental
questions of what it means for Israel to be a Jewish state. A religious exemption
from military service is unlikely to be as polemical in a social context where few
claim such exemptions, or where the exemption is not linked to the identity of a
polity.
Given that the mega-political nature of an issue-area is context-specific and
depends on the mobilization of a host of actors, it is impossible to precisely
predefine a list of issues that are mega-political. Moreover, as politics is fluid and
social preferences change and shift over time and in response to stakeholder
politicization, we are also reluctant to impose a threshold definition of when an
issue crosses into the zone of mega-politics. Each article included in this special
issue will explain why the issue-area(s) the authors are investigating is megapolitical. Since we are operating in a target-rich environment, finding issues and
cases that fit the category is not difficult. Rather than trying to define a threshold,
this Part theorizes about the types of disputes that tend to engender the
international adjudication of mega-politics.
We divide the types of IC cases that give rise to mega-political issues into
three broad categories which might operate on their own or in combination: 1)
inter-state disputes involving significant domestic social mobilization; 2)
domestically divisive disputes where an IC is asked to resolve an issue that divides

17. Dejudicialization is “the complete removal from judicial cognizance of a policy issue that had
previously been subject to judicialization.” Daniel Abebe & Tom Ginsburg, The Dejudicialization of
International Politics? 63 INT’L STU. Q. 521, 521 (2019) [hereinafter Abebe & Ginsburg, The
Dejudicialization of International Politics?].
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a single polity; and 3) sovereignty-based disputes where judicial intervention
interferes with deeply held notions of state sovereignty. For now, we invoke these
categories mainly to identify a broad set of issues that can be explored in
empirical studies. However, some cases span the categories, and quite often
partisans intentionally blur the categories to mobilize for or against IC
intervention.
A. Inter-State Driven Mega-Politics
Inter-state driven mega-politics concerns disputes where important state
interests diverge and where both the respective publics and governments of the
disputing states perceive strong stakes in the outcome. Such a dispute by
definition involves two or more countries, and thus the dispute spans borders.
The dispute will be mega-political when something very significant is perceived
to be at stake, when the state-parties are at loggerheads, and when at least one
nation’s society is mobilized for or against understandings of the law and issue.
Some territorial disputes, such as the on-going dispute between China and
neighboring countries regarding the South China Seas, fall in this category of
politically sensitive inter-state conflicts. What makes this high-stakes dispute
mega-political is that the Chinese government and its neighbors have historic and
longstanding commitments to their territorial claims, and the Chinese
Communist Party has mobilized the Chinese public on the importance of the
dispute to China’s position as a world power. In addition, even if as a formal
matter the actual arbitration only involved China and the Philippines, China’s
territorial claims adversely affect security, fishing, and free passage rights of a
number of other countries in the region and beyond. The aggressiveness of
China’s position in this dispute, and the historical claims other states have to the
same islands, also makes this case a litmus test for a broader set of issues and
concerns. For this reason, one can well imagine this dispute regarding
uninhabited rocks could provoke military hostilities. By contrast, other territorial
disputes, such as the dispute between Canada and the United States over fishing
rights and thereby implicitly territory in the Bay of Fundy,18 are not megapolitical because although fishing interests matter greatly, neither the
governments nor larger segments of society see the issue as a fundamental threat
to their legal rights or interests.
In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has experienced
a surge of inter-state cases, some of which are about mega-political issues related
to territory. Many of these cases stem from Russia’s involvement in violent
disputes over territory with neighboring countries. The Russo-Georgian War in
2008, for example, prompted an interstate complaint (and thousands of individual
applications).19 More recently, the Russo-Ukrainian warfare triggered an
18. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1982
I.C.J. Rep. 560, ¶ 22 (Nov. 5).
19. See, e.g., Georgia v. Russia (No. 1), Judgment, App. No. 13255/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014); Georgia
v. Russia (No. 2), Judgment, App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2021); Georgia v. Russia (No. 3), App.
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interstate complaint.20 Mega-political disputes concerning territory can also reach
ICs more indirectly, as Salvatore Caserta and Pola Cebulak explain in their
contribution.21 Caserta and Cebulak explore what they label international
adjudication of territorial disputes by proxy. This occurs when “new-style” ICs,
that is, regional economic and human rights ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and
private access, adjudicate cases brought by individuals that are linked to an
underlying territorial controversy between two or more states.22
The interstate category presumes that the two countries align differently on
the international legal question. This category will often blur into the
sovereignty-driven category insofar as governments insist that ICs should have
no say on the issue. The more states and their populations are at odds with the
substance of the law that ICs are called upon to adjudicate, and the more
international law is not updated to reflect the changing circumstances of states,
the more likely inter-state mega-political disputes will implicate ICs. In this
respect, one wonders how climate change might present governments and judges
with hard choices regarding whether to uphold existing international legal
understandings and agreements.23 Governments might face the choice of
respecting foreign property and contractual claims or providing locally produced
food and energy to local populations. ICs might face the choice of defending
contracts despite grave social costs for populations who were not part of the
initial contractual bargain. Climate change inspired litigation may well become
an issue that is sometimes litigated, and other times governments may simply
refuse to export the promised goods. While out-of-court legal claims and counterclaims are not part of our inquiry, they are elements of judicialized international
politics and judicialized mega-politics. For now, the point is that two countries
may end up deeply divided on an issue and a specific case, on whether the
international law in question is fair or legitimate, or on whether force majeure
necessitates or should permit a derogation. These divisions may generate interstate mega-political legal disputes.
B. Social-Cleavage Driven Mega-Politics
This category of cases includes issues involving deep domestic social divisions
and cleavages within a single polity that end up before ICs. There are various
reasons why issues that may inflame strong cleavages in domestic societies end
up in an international legal venue. In the European Union context, many issues
that used to be domestically governed are now in whole or in part matters of
European Union law. Notably, issues related to social-economic politics and
No. 61186/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
20. Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea), Judgment, App. No. 20958/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2020).
21. Salvatore Caserta & Pola Cebulak, Territorial Disputes by Proxy: The Indirect Involvement of
International Courts in the Mega-Politics of Territory, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 123.
22. Id. at 124.
23. There are not many inter-state cases, pending or decided, concerning climate change, but
Caserta and Cebulak discuss the recent dispute over the River San Juan in Central America brought
before the ICJ. Id. at 132.
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criminal law have caused controversies. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Michael
Blauberger’s contribution investigates how the European Union’s Posted
Worker Directive disrupted national practices,24 putting pressure on an existing
labor-capital social cleavage and engendering inter-state conflict between socialwelfare oriented member states and new members of the European Union.
James Thuo Gathii and Olabisi D. Akinkugbe’s article focuses on a different
type of cleavage-driven mega-politics, examining election disputes that end up in
front of ICs. By definition, election cases represent situations where society is
divided. Whether ICs have jurisdiction over domestic election disputes is
sometimes part of the controversy.25 Yet if the government has used its
incumbent powers to manipulate the election process, and should domestic
courts be unwilling or unable to challenge the outcome, the likelihood of IC
involvement increases.26 Election disputes often blur into the sovereignty driven
mega-politics, discussed next, as the format of elections and their processes will
typically be presented as constitutional and domestic political issues.
Human rights related cases often involve issues that implicate both
constitutional and international individual rights. There are a number of human
rights issues governed by international law that are hotly contested in different
parts of the world. These issues include women’s rights, the line separating state
and religion, and the rights of minority groups or migrants. When international
legal review generates substantially different legal interpretations than that of
national law and national review, it may inflame a social cleavage that had been
suppressed. Focusing on disputes involving lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) rights, Laurence Helfer and Clare Ryan investigate how
international judicial intervention interacts with domestic social cleavages.27
Their analysis is particularly interesting because they find that adjudication of
LGBT rights, which had been settled in many European countries, became
increasingly mega-political over time. The increase arose as the ECtHR extended
its case law to new and more controversial issues, and as some political leaders,
especially in former-Soviet Bloc states, began to repress LGBT communities.
Helfer and Ryan also explain how the ECtHR initially avoided mega-political
controversies, and why avoiding such controversies has become more difficult
over time.

24. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen & Michael Blauberger, The Court of Justice of the European Union
and the Mega-Politics of Posted Workers, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 29.
25. James Thuo Gathii & Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Judicialization of Election Disputes in Africa’s
International Courts, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 181.
26. Dmitry Kurnosov theorizes how the ECtHR should adopt a ‘pragmatic’ style in adjudicating
election cases. See Dmitry Kurnosov, Pragmatic Adjudication of Election Cases in the European Court of
Human Rights, 32 EUR. J. INT’L L. 255, 256 (2021).
27. Laurence R. Helfer & Clare Ryan, LGBT Rights as Mega-Politics: Litigating before the ECtHR,
84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 59.
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C. Sovereignty Driven Mega-Politics
Sovereignty driven mega-politics cases concern issues that involve one or
more states where the issue is mega-political because an IC’s involvement or a
particular legal interpretation is seen by politicians as transgressing national
sovereignty. For the mega-political definition to hold, the possibility of rallying
significant public support behind the political position must also exist.
Sovereignty is, however, a contested idea that can be hard to pin-down because
political actors deploy the category vaguely and with plasticity. While not the
only framework one might use, Stephen Krasner’s categorization of the three
forms of sovereignty is helpful because it highlights the different ways in which
international law comes to be seen as intruding on sovereignty.28
Krasner separates three distinct forms of sovereignty. His key point is that
these three forms of sovereignty are separable and not organically linked so that
countries can have one form of sovereignty but be effectively missing another.29
International legal sovereignty is a form of externally conferred legal recognition
that allows states to enter into contracts and treaties and become members of
international organizations. The international community confers international
legal sovereignty by recognizing a political entity as a “state,” which in turn
generates the state’s legal right to enter into (and withdraw from) treaties and
other international obligations. The second form, Westphalian-Vattelian
sovereignty, conceives of sovereignty as an indigenous core right (in Krasner’s
words, it is “autochthonously generated”) whereby “the state is not subject to
any external authority, even authority structures that the state has itself
voluntarily created through the exercise of international legal sovereignty.”30 The
third form, domestic sovereignty, is a contingent category that exists when states
are “able to regulate and control activities within their territory.”31 The
separability of these forms of sovereignty helps to explain why state consent to
international adjudication may not matter to some political partisans who later
take the position that IC review violates one or more of these forms of
sovereignty.
International adjudication may run afoul of international legal sovereignty
when an IC interprets a treaty obligation significantly differently from how
governments understand the obligation. A legally technical but politically salient

28. Stephen D. Krasner, The Persistance of State Sovereignty, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN TIME 39 (Orfeo Fioretos ed., 2017) [hereinafter Krasner, The Persistence of State
Sovereignty]. See also Neil Walker, The Sovereignty Surplus, 18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 370 (2020) for a fuller
and more legally nuanced discussion of the many contours of sovereignty [hereinafter Walker, The
Sovereignty Surplus].
29. Krasner provides examples to illustrate the three conceptions. Taiwan has Westphalian and
domestic sovereignty, but not international legal sovereignty; Somalia has international legal and
Westphalian sovereignty even though it lacks effective domestic sovereignty; and the Solomon Islands
has international legal sovereignty despite lacking Westphalian and effective domestic sovereignty. See
Krasner, The Persistence of State Sovereignty, supra note 28, at 41–42.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 41.
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example involves the longstanding disagreement between the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body and the US over the calculation of antidumping duties. American critics charge that the Appellate Body added legal
restrictions that the US had not agreed to, thus violating its international legal
sovereignty.32 WTO rulings on this issue have generated a strong governmental
counter-response,33 yet the issue itself does not inflame social groups in the US
or elsewhere. Instead of complaining about WTO rulings on this technical issue,
critics lambast the WTO and its Appellate Body more generally, arguing that the
WTO and its legal rulings compromise domestic sovereignty by applying rules
that the US never consented to, undermining national regulatory choice.34
Lawyers might counter by arguing that the Appellate Body has not transgressed
beyond the confines of WTO law, but this type of response speaks to
international legal sovereignty while ignoring concerns about domestic
sovereignty.
Actors who complain that international law cannot transgress national
sovereignty are often implicitly invoking Krasner’s category of
Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty. Often a rather vague notion, the claim is that
IC review is trampling a core element of what it means to be sovereign.35 Those
who make a Westphalian sovereignty argument typically claim that national
legislation and executive decisions that are validly adopted under domestic
procedures should ipso facto be beyond international legal scrutiny.
Authoritarian leaders, democracies predicated upon the idea of parliamentary
supremacy, and national legal systems that reject judicial review may be
especially likely to invoke Westphalian sovereignty in response to disfavored
international rulings. This is so even if the state has joined international treaties
and implemented consequential legislation. For example, international rules
concerning the treatment of migrants, asylum seekers or foreign workers may be
seen as core sovereignty intrusions notwithstanding that states have bound

32. In the United States’ view, WTO law was crafted to allow for the US practice of ‘zeroing.’ See
generally William W. Nye, The Implications of “zeroing” for Enforcement of US Antidumping Laws, 12
J. ECON. POL’Y REFORM. 263 (2009) (explaining the conflict between the US and the WTO on the issue
of zeroing).
33. US executive branch’s anger on this issue has led it to block appointments to the WTO Appellate
Body, ultimately resulting in the de facto suspension of that IC. See Greg Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Mark
A. Pollack, US Threats to the WTO Appellate Body (Univ. of Cal. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 201763, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087524 [https://perma.cc/WPF9-SF6G].
34. Claude Barfield sees the “judicialized” WTO as politically unsustainable because member states
disagree about complex regulatory issues, and the WTO’s adjudicatory mechanism will be called upon to
disputes where the legal texts “contain gaps, ambiguities and contradictory language.” Creating law will,
in his view, raise “intractable questions of democratic legitimacy.” Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade,
Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 408 (2001)
[hereinafter Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization].
35. As Neil Walker explains, the sovereignty claims have proliferated over time. Walker is mainly
examining scholarly discussions of sovereignty, yet he notes that “sketchiness and contentiousness colors
the academic treatment of sovereignty”, and he argues that the ways the concept is invoked generate
unanswerable questions. See Walker, The Sovereignty Surplus, supra note 28, at 371–72.
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themselves to international rules regarding these policies.36 This claim is often
made in conjunction with an international legal sovereignty claim that the IC in
question has illegitimately expanded the agreed treaty while potentially also
acting ultra vires.
In this special issue, Silvia Steininger & Nicole Deitelhoff explore the
question of the international adjudication of peace and security conflicts.37 At the
heart of these conflicts are core principles of international law concerning nonintervention and territorial sovereignty, and the prohibition of aggression. Yet,
developments in international criminal law have intruded on some of these
principles, notably by the attribution of criminal responsibility for certain very
serious international crimes. Steininger and Deitelhoff show how this
development collides with basic ideas of sovereignty and creates mega-politics.
Yet, they also demonstrate that notwithstanding the sovereignty concerns, the
turn to ICs can mitigate conflicts, for instance by slowing them down and creating
new and common spaces for solving conflicts.
A final sovereignty-related category involves jus cogens and international
criminal law. For example, peremptory norms, which are not constrained by
formal notions of consent, may prevent states from providing amnesties for
certain crimes. Absent jus cogens norms (or specific international human rights
agreements), the decision to grant amnesty would be a sovereign prerogative
determined by domestic legal bodies and not subject to international review.
And, absent international adjudication, government violations of their national
jus cogens rights may remain unnamed and unchecked. In this special issue,
Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Edoardo Stoppioni consider how the category of jus
cogens generates inter-state clashes, identifying how complaints are about both
international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.38
Examples reveal that the sovereignty category may or may not engender
mega-politics. In the WTO example, the US government was upset that the WTO
dispute settlement kept condemning its zeroing practice, but this concern did not
inflame public passions. The specific concerns have been redirected at targets
that are more likely to inflame the public. For example, President Trump
politicized trade imbalances with China, blaming the WTO for failing to stop
China’s “illegal” practices. It is not clear which Chinese practices the U.S.
considers illegal, but the larger issue is that WTO membership has constrained
US policy and the WTO’s legal system did not vindicate the Trump
administration’s sense that China had violated WTO law. These WTO examples
highlight the malleability of invoking the sovereignty category to transform a
36. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Two-Level Politics and the Backlash against International
Courts: Evidence from the Politicisation of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 BRIT. J. OF POL. &
INT’L REL. 728 (2020) (exploring whether international institutions are more susceptible to political
backlash than domestic ones due to the dual nature of international politics).
37. Silvia Steininger & Nicole Deitelhoff, Against the Masters of War: The Overlooked Functions of
Conflict Litigation by International Courts, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 95.
38. Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Edoardo Stoppioni, Jus Cogens before International Courts: the MegaPolitical Side of the Story, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 153.
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fairly ordinary legal suit into a mega-political dispute, in this case by channeling
deep disagreements over global trade fairness and geopolitics towards the WTO
and its legal system.
D. The Three Categories of Mega-Politics
These three categories of mega-political issues that may be brought before
ICs are expanded upon in Table 1 below. The first category, interstate driven
mega-politics, implicates more than one state by definition. The second and third
categories, social cleavage and sovereignty-driven mega-politics, may involve
only one state, but the generalizability of the issue to other states can raise
concerns and trigger reactions in countries that are not themselves parties to the
dispute. Because adjudicating mega-politics is politically sensitive, for all three
categories, countries that are not part of the dispute may be concerned enough
to lend support to backlash efforts of the more directly impacted countries. As is
apparent from the discussion, some issues may fit into more than one category,
for example, election disputes.
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Table 1: Three categories of mega-political issues

Nature of
the issue

Examples:

Inter-state driven
mega-politics
Disputes where
important state
interests diverge, and
where not only
governments but also
peoples within the
disputing states
perceive a strong
stake in the outcome.

-Territorial disputes
(ex. Cyprus, Crimea,
South China Seas,
etc.)
-Currency
manipulation, with a
market economy
versus state owned
enterprises/subsidies
-Torture as it
intersects with
terrorism
-Economic shocks
triggering a need for
exceptions regarding
int’l contracts &
trade (e.g., sov debt +
bailouts)
-Peace settlements
after mass atrocities

Social cleavage driven
mega-politics
Disputes involving
domestic issues that
end up in an
international
adjudicatory venue.
Strong cleavages in
domestic societies
undergird the dispute,
and there may well be
transnational
divergence in social
support for and against
the issue.
- LGBTQ+ rights
versus ‘traditional’
values
-Secular versus
religious divisions
-Migration versus
citizenship rights
- Free mobility versus
welfare rights
-Women’s rights versus
patriarchal values
-Election disputes
(national elections that
end up disputed in int’l
venues)

Sovereignty driven
mega-politics
Disputes mostly
involve one country.
They are megapolitical because
international
adjudicators are
intervening in issues
many regard as
national or sovereign.

-Prosecuting heads of
state
-Amnesty laws &
right to exile
-Intellectual property
as it implicates access
to medicine
-Election disputes
(national elections
that end up disputed
in int’l venues)
-Some disputes with
foreign investors.

E. Do These Categories Predict IC Involvement in Mega-Politics or Backlash
Against ICs?
Table 1 categorization considers whether the structure of the dispute, as
primarily inter-state or domestic in nature, shaped whether international
adjudication became more or less contested. One might imagine, for example,
that an IC’s jurisdiction over an inter-state dispute might be less contested either
because the two parties consented to international adjudication or because
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domestic courts would not be able to rule on the case themselves. A similar logic
would lead us to expect that sovereignty-driven disputes might be especially
polemical precisely because, absent international law, the contested action might
be fully legal or national courts would be left alone to resolve the dispute. Indeed
national-populist backlash against ICs seems to be largely inspired by the
sovereignty category.39 And the “nationalist” part of national-populism could
generate controversy around inter-state disputes. This Article’s suppositions that
the source of the conflict might generate insight about the likelihood of megapolitics or backlash, however, quickly broke down once applied to concrete cases.
In particular, contributors to this special issue found that disputes often involve
more than one of these categories.
The blurring of categories may be intentional and part of political strategies.
Even if an analyst can firmly locate a dispute in one specific category (for
example, the WTO example of a zeroing dispute is an inter-state dispute),
partisans may frame a dispute as falling within various categories in an effort to
mobilize political support. For example, Zimbabwe’s attack on the Southern
African Development Community Tribunal (SADCT) seemingly derived from
sovereignty-driven mega-politics. Indeed, Zimbabwe’s President’s immediate
reaction was to dismiss the ruling by arguing that “Some farmers went to the
SADC [T]ribunal in Namibia, but that’s nonsense, absolute nonsense, no one will
follow that . . . We have courts here in this country, that can determine the rights
of people. Our land issues are not subject to the SADC [T]ribunal.”40 Tendayi
Achiume would challenge the definition of this dispute as sovereignty-driven.
Achiume argues that the farmer’s case was also a social cleavage driven case that
pitted landless Zimbabweans against white landowners, and that reanimated
nationalist freedom fighters in their desire to challenge the post-colonial
settlement.41 Recognizing that other Southern African governments could have
their own concerns, as the mega-politics unfolded, Zimbabwe’s President
Mugabe’s attacks on the Tribunal were wide ranging. His government’s claims
involved international legal sovereignty complaints contesting the validity of the
SADCT, inter-state complaints about a European-funded SADCT imposing
colonial legacies, and diplomatic appeals where Zimbabwe’s Minister of Justice
warned other SADC countries that the Tribunal might also intervene in their
domestic land dispute cases.42
39. See Voeten, supra note 6. It is also true, however, that right-leaning populist leaders tend to
target minorities, migrants, and issues that they can negatively associate with political opponents.
Populist leaders may even welcome international adjudication because it provides an opportunity for
them to mobilize their members in opposition to external interference.
40. Alter et al, Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa, supra note
6, at 309.
41. She further notes how the Zimbabwean social cleavage also resonated in South Africa, where
the issue of post-colonial land redistribution remained politically sensitive. E. Tendayi Achiume, The
SADC Tribunal: Sociopolitical Dissonance and the Authority of International Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
COURT AUTHORITY 124 (Karen J. Alter, et al. eds., 2018).
42. Alter et al, Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa, supra note
6, at 310–14.
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The point is that politicization may make the root classification analytically
irrelevant as the dispute evolves. Or it may well be that issues become more
politically divisive when an issue can be framed as involving more than one of the
categories identified. This uniting of the three frames can help to build a coalition
of opposition to IC involvement, and IC involvement may in turn be used to
mobilize support against a larger set of institutions and actors. In other words,
the backlash politics may well be larger than the dispute or the legal issue in
question, in which case international judges may find that no matter what they
do, the ruling will become a lightning rod of political contestation.43
These three categories nevertheless help us understand why compared to the
past, ICs today are increasingly involved in adjudicating mega-politics. The
categories also help to define a set of issues that scholars might investigate. The
categories could even have predictive value. If one, for example, studied the
range of issues that ICs adjudicate, one could well find that state parties are more
likely to seek a political settlement for cases that fall into these three categories,
regardless of the clarity of an international law violation, because all involved
want to avoid a potentially explosive or precedential ruling on the merits of the
case. For the purpose of this study, what matters is that the categories help
identify the basic contours of the disputes we are studying. The categories
moreover help to explain why it is difficult for ICs to avoid entering into megapolitical cases. The framing plasticity of the sovereignty category, in particular,
further helps us understand why IC authority may be affected and backlash
sentiments provoked even if the IC never ends up ruling on the merits of a megapolitics dispute.
IV
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND MEGA-POLITICS: CHALLENGES AND
STRATEGIES
This Part identifies the challenges and risks that international judges face in
dealing with mega-political cases, identifies some strategies that judges draw on
to navigate this fraught terrain, and discusses how entering into mega-political
disputes may affect IC authority.
A. The Distinctive Challenges of International Adjudication of Mega-Politics
There are two general concerns about the adjudication of mega-politics,
especially in the context of functioning democracies: 1) that political means
would be better at resolving the dispute, and 2) that courts will be unable to
helpfully contribute to the resolution of a conflict. Politically brokered solutions
may be preferable, especially if inducements can be added to the bargain, if
political negotiators have greater political legitimacy, and if consent makes
43. See generally Karen J. Alter & Michael Zürn, Conceptualizing Backlash Politics: Introduction to
a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison, 22 BRIT. J. POL. AND INT’L REL. 563 (2020)
(explaining the factors that animate backlash politics).
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compliance more likely. But a preference for a political solution is often beside
the point. Frequently mega-political disputes end up in court because politics has
not resolved the issue, or because policymakers side-stepped opponents, in some
cases violating procedural or substantive law requirements. That said, critics of
the judicialization of international relations lament using ICs as appeals
chambers for political choices that from a domestic perspective are substantively
and legally defensible. This sentiment, understandable as it is, offers scant
guidance for judges who are presented with a well-founded legal suit that falls
squarely within their jurisdiction.
The second claim, that judicial intervention will not help, is something that
lawyers and social scientists have debated in-depth. Scholars have long observed
that adjudication is least effective in certain contexts. For example, Lon Fuller
expected adjudication to be ineffective or a failure vis-a-vis polycentric problems,
meaning where there are multiple centers and thus “many affected parties and a
somewhat fluid state of affairs.”44 Mega-political cases present additional
concerns. The political salience of the issue is likely to infect the adjudicatory
process, increasing the scrutiny and pressure on judges and perhaps even
mobilizing antagonists to obfuscate or stymie the legal process by withholding,
contradicting, or despoiling evidence as a strategy for criticizing an anticipated
judicial outcome.
That mega-political cases are both polycentric and highly politicized puts
international judges in a complex position. Judges could find a way to avoid
ruling, using some of the techniques this Part will soon discuss. Yet especially if
a legal case is carefully selected and constructed to fit squarely within an IC’s
jurisdiction, international judges might face a binary choice: they can either rule
on the merits as best they can, create a de facto reality that can leave a
government’s questionable international legal interpretations unaddressed, or
render courts or legal justice inconsequential or even unavailable.
A less voiced concern is that the international adjudication of mega-politics
might provoke a political reaction that leads to the dejudicialization of an IC or
the elimination of legal access so that clear legal violations can no longer be
adjudicated. This radical solution is rare but not unheard of.45 The conclusion to
this special issue will return to this topic. A salient point for now is that

44. Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 397 (1978). Fuller worried that polycentric contexts would generate inadequate participation by
stakeholders, rendering judges insufficiently informed and “ill-equipped to determine the complex
repercussions of a proposed decision.” J. W. F. Allison, Fuller’s Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the
Limits of Adjudication, 53 THE CAMBRIDGE L. J. 367, 370 (1994).
45. Unhappy governments blocked appointments to the SADC Tribunal and the WTO appellate
body, forcing the IC’s shut down. The WTO system is not entirely shut down, since panels can still
adjudicate cases. The SADC Tribunal is, at this point, non-existent because the new Protocol on the
Tribunal on The Southern African Development Community has yet to be ratified by SADC members.
See Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, supra
note 34 (regarding the WTO). See also Alter et al, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East
and Southern Africa, supra note 6 (on the SADC Tribunal).
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dejudicialization can only be enacted by states, and it is very rare.46
So long as ICs still exist and exercise jurisdiction over inter-state
controversies, issues where there are deep domestic divisions, and issues that
touch on the sovereignty of states, we can expect ICs to adjudicate mega-political
disputes. The question then becomes: how should or do ICs proceed, and how
does adjudication of mega-politics affect IC authority?
B. International Judicial Strategies for Politically Sensitive Cases
ICs are used to navigating around politically charged legal suits. Focusing on
what he calls avoidance strategies, Jed Odermatt identifies a range of interpretive
techniques that ICs have used to sidestep ruling on highly political cases,
including deciding that a case is ‘non-legal’ in nature, finding that a ‘dispute’ does
not actually exist, rejecting the standing of the complainant or finding that the
case is not admissible, deferring to political bodies or national decision-makers,
and minimizing the dispute to avoid or limit political controversy.47 Another
strategy involves stalling the case in the hopes that the case will settle or that a
key player may leave the political stage.48 If these strategies fail because, for
example, the case falls squarely within an IC’s remit and both the law and the
violation are clear and obvious, judges can turn to strict legal formalism. They
can set a high threshold of proof to assess the evidence presented by the parties,
shrink the precedential value of a ruling, reframe the legal question to render it
smaller and more technocratic, or hew closely to the wording of relevant legal
texts.49 Skillful legal formalism shifts the blame to the law’s drafters, signaling to
litigants that they should focus on changing the law rather than shooting the
messenger. Moreover, in some instances, ICs can defer the cases back to national
authorities, for example via the principle of complementarity in international
criminal law as shown by Steininger and Deitelhoff, or through strict
46. IC dejudicialization is enacted in three ways: 1) by states exiting an international agreement; 2)
by states exiting the jurisdiction of an IC; 3) by a collective action of governments to change controversial
legislation or the IC’s mandate. If states do not want to exit an agreement (option 1), are unable to leave
an IC’s jurisdiction (option 2), and lack support to change the IC’s mandate (option 3), the only strategy
left is to ignore the court or to try to sabotage the legal process. See Abebe and Ginsburg, The
Dejudicialization of International Politics?, supra note 17, at 525–26, for an explanation of why
dejudicialization is so rare.
47. Jed Odermatt, Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions before International Courts, 14 INT’L
J. L. CONTEXT 221, 227–3 (2018).
48. An example of drawn out proceedings are the disputes over land rights after the de facto division
of Cyprus in 1974 described by Salvatore Caserta and Pola Cebulak in this issue, supra note 21. These
highly divisive cases were only starting to be resolved by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
more than two decades after the division of Cyprus. See, e.g., Lozidou v. Turkey, Case No.
40/1993/435/514, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996).
49. Alter and Helfer discuss how the Andean Tribunal uses legal formalism to avoid political
pushback, stating that “formalist reasoning may be a prudent strategy for tribunals that face legally and
politically inhospitable environments.”). See KAREN J. ALTER & LAURENCE R. HELFER,
TRANSPLANTING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE ANDEAN TRIBUNAL OF
JUSTICE 17 (2017). See also Mikael Rask Madsen, The Narrowing of the European Court of Human
Rights? Legal Diplomacy, Situational Self-Restraint and the New Vision of the Court, 2 EUR.
CONVENTION ON HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2021).
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interpretation of provisions related to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.50
Not only will a formalist blame avoidance strategy not always work, but
judges may also not want to prioritize avoiding blame over other goals such as
developing or defending the law. The larger spirit of the law, the goals of the
relevant legal system, or the needs of justice might also be such that judges cannot
or do not want to avoid issuing a substantive legal ruling. The contributions to
this special issue consider how ICs navigate the fraught cases that are presented
to them. Martinsen and Blauberger see the CJEU as having engaged the legal
issue head on, and they suggest that the CJEU’s intervention helped diffuse some
of the contestation surrounding the Posted Workers Directive by balancing the
interests of affected actors.51 Helfer and Ryan see the ECtHR as having applied
an equality and non-discrimination perspective that for decades facilitated the
expansion of LGBT legal protections without triggering significant pushback or
backlash. Yet the authors also worry about whether this balancing act can be
maintained in the face of a new set of LGBT rights disputes and the emergence
of social cleavages over LGBT rights in several Council of Europe member
states.52 Gathii and Akinkugbe explain why African nationals continue to bring
electoral disputes to African ICs, even if their legal concerns about the contested
election are seldom, if ever, vindicated. Their analysis suggests that African ICs
sidestep issuing controversial rulings on the merits, yet African IC involvement
is nonetheless seen as valuable by the litigants and by Gathii and Akinkugbe.53
Steininger and Deitelhoff show how ICs’ involvement in peace and security
disputes serve a number of functions, ranging from slowing down conflicts and
creating good offices to clarifying legal norms.54 These are four examples of ICs
entering contested territories and providing something that stakeholders value
without inciting dejudicialization. The conclusion to the special issue returns to
this topic, drawing from the special issue contributions to identify ways that ICs
enter the political fray while avoiding inciting backlash and dejudicialization.
C. Impact of Adjudicating Mega-Politics on IC Authority
While not all resistance to ICs challenges IC authority or seeks
dejudicialization, the focus on mega-politics is intended to help us think about
the more severe category of backlash against ICs.55 Backlash is typically defined

50. Steininger & Deitelhoff, supra note 37; see generally Madsen, supra note 49 (discussing
formalism and the interpretation of procedural requirements).
51. Martinsen and Blauberger, supra note 24.
52. Helfer & Ryan, supra note 27.
53. Gathii & Akinkugbe, supra note 25.
54. Steininger & Deitelhoff, supra note 37.
55. Some scholars introduce a distinction between pushback and backlash where pushback, the most
common response, is seen as an ordinary form of resistance concerning the direction of the law, whereas
backlash is seen as involving extraordinary attacks on the judicial institution and its authority. See, e.g.,
Madsen et al., Backlash Against International Courts, supra note 6, at 198 (stating that pushback occurs
when individual Member States seek to influence the future of case law but backlash occurs in critique
to a significant institutional reform).
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as extraordinary efforts by governments to reverse a contested ruling, usually
through dejudicialization.56 The previous Part noted that complete
dejudicialization, or the stripping of IC authority to adjudicate a range of cases,
is rare. One reason for its rarity is that it is so much easier to work out a political
compromise or to simply ignore an adverse IC legal ruling. The special issue
contributors focused on litigation of politically charged mega-politics issues, yet
in no case was the result of the litigation a dejudicialization of ICs’ ability to
intervene in the future. However, even if dejudicialization efforts are never
articulated or fail to achieve their stated goals, deeply felt animosity and
resistance may adversely affect an IC’s authority and influence.57 To explain this
point, this Part draws on the authority framework developed by Karen J. Alter,
Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen.58
Alter et al. define IC authority as an IC’s “ability to influence practices in law,
politics and society.”59 More specifically, IC authority is a court’s ability to project
its ideas and values about the law and to have these projections reflected by, or
even internalized in, the actions of individuals, groups, and organizations in
society.”60 Their framework sees IC authority in relational terms and as existing
across a continuum that includes “no authority in fact,” narrow authority (an
ability to influence the litigants), intermediate authority (the ability to influence
similarly situated litigants), extensive authority (the ability to influence the
practices of the broader legal field of actors, like lawyers and in-house counsels,
legal scholars, civil society groups, and bar associations), and popular authority
(the ability to induce respect in the general public).61 Government resistance can
directly shape an IC’s narrow authority, and vociferous resistance may also
influence intermediate, extensive and popular authority.62 The point is that,
should the various audiences that pressure others to comply with international
law begin to ignore IC rulings, to stop seeing IC rulings as binding, or to stop
agitating for respect for international law, the adjudication of mega-political
disputes may contribute to a de facto dejudicialization where the IC’s formal
authority remains intact, but “despite identified violations, litigants do not file
complaints with the IC, and cases that the court does decide are generally
ignored.”63
56. See Caserta & Cebulak, supra note 21.
57. See Alter, The High Water Mark of International Judicialization?, supra note 10, at 14–17 (stating
dejudicialization can shrink IC’s authority, but IC authority will also be undermined if fewer audiences
accept the binding nature of the rulings).
58. Alter et al., International Court Authority, supra note 5, at 24.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 31–33.
62. The focus on this broader range of actors builds on Alter’s argument that ICs influence states
and politics by connecting with compliance partners and compliance supporters within states. See Alter,
The New Terrain of International Law, supra note 3, at 61 (citing concerns about compliance partners
harming rather than helping compliance supporters).
63. Alter et al. call this a situation where ICs have “no authority in fact.” International Court
Authority, supra note 5, at 31.
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The concern about undermining IC authority is where the question of the
international adjudication of mega-politics intersects with debates about
backlash and populism. Focusing specifically on national populism and ICs, Erik
Voeten elaborates the many reasons for populist leaders’ backlash against ICs,
highlighting the clash between illiberal populist values and liberal international
law.64 Voeten notes that populists do not oppose all institutions, only institutions
that do not, in their view, produce morally correct outcomes, and he finds that
not all populist leaders oppose ICs or their rulings.65 But eighteen of the twentyeight instances that meet Voeten’s definition of backlash were instigated by
populist leaders,66 and contestation involved liberal issues that populists typically
deride (private property rights, minority rights, and identity-related issues).67
Voeten adds important nuances, which help us to understand why not every
populist leader exercises their right to withdraw from an IC’s jurisdiction, and
why populist revolts do not necessarily translate into a shrinking of IC authority.
Insofar as Voeten sees populism as creating social divisions around certain issues,
his analysis overlaps with this article’s category of social cleavage driven megapolitics.
But our point is different. We see populism as creating an inherent and
unavoidable risk for IC authority insofar as ICs are tasked with applying rules
that populist leaders have already mobilized against. On the one hand, we do not
presume that a populist backlash harms an IC’s authority (indeed Voeten notes
that many of the instances of backlash he identifies do not succeed in their
substantive goal). If the only outcome is that populist leaders do not participate
in international litigation or comply with specific IC rulings, an IC’s narrow
authority (its ability to influence the parties to the dispute) may be undermined
at the same time that its intermediate authority (its ability to influence similarly
situated litigants) and its extensive authority (support within the national legal
field) may be bolstered.
On the other hand, if populist leaders voice arguments that have a broader
popular resonance, even if these arguments have little to no bearing on the legal
case at hand, populism might undermine popular authority. Also, populist
leaders might attack or remove the key domestic officials that are involved in
generating an IC’s intermediate authority. By associating international law with
elite and Western values, by reminding citizens that ICs compromise national
sovereignty, and by framing even reasonable IC rulings as a fundamental threat

64. Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, supra note 6, at 408–12. Voeten
argues that many backlashes against ICs occur because ICs are seen as elite institutions that promote
liberal principles such as property rights and human rights.
65. Id. at 412.
66. Id. at 410. For Voeten, backlash includes a state’s concrete proposals to curb an IC’s authority
and a state-level decision to exit from an IC’s authority, regardless of whether the efforts succeed. Id at
408–10. This is the same definition used by Alter, Gathii and Helfer. Alter et al., Backlash Against
International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa, supra note 6.
67. Id. at 414–17; see generally Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash,
49 ARIZ. STATE L .J. 795 (2017) (describing a different and broader set of issues identified by populists).
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to the national constitution or national identity, populist resistance can build into
a larger backlash politics aimed at questioning the political value of specific
international institutions (e.g. the European Union, human rights treaties), of a
more internationally open national orientation, of multilateralism, and of the rule
of law more generally.68
Our larger point is that whether resistance, populist or other forms, actually
undermines an IC’s authority, contributes to social peace, or resolves the dispute
depends on how other actors or audiences respond to such resistance.69 More
extreme efforts to dejudicialize or sanction an IC often fail because constellations
of other actors come to the rescue of the court and help it survive moments of
crisis.70 Yet even if an IC’s formal legal (e.g. its de jure) authority remains intact,
its de facto authority may be diminished. We will return to this issue in the
conclusion to this special issue.
This Part has identified strategies that ICs can use to avoid issuing contentious
rulings. While avoidance strategies exist, and they have sometimes been applied
to rulings as discussed by our contributors, ICs have also issued rulings on the
merits in all of the issue areas studied in this special issue. The questions this
Article raises, but is unable to definitively answer, are when and how the IC’s
overall authority is undermined by adjudicating mega-political disputes. These
are tricky questions, as in order to understand if IC authority is increased or
decreased by the adjudication of mega-political disputes, we would need to know
the pre-dispute baseline of IC authority. This special issue’s conclusion returns to
this topic, drawing on the articles in this special issue to explain how ICs engage
and seek to minimize an adverse political response to their engagement.

68. Here we are drawing on the definition of backlash politics articulated by Alter and Zürn, where
backlash politics involves extraordinary tactics that challenge dominant scripts, has an overall retrograde
objective of returning to a real or imagined prior condition (in this case, the condition of absolute
sovereignty), and backlash complaints enter political discourse. See Alter & Zürn, Conceptualizing
Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison, 22 BRIT. J. OF POL.
AND INT’L REL., 563, 566–68 (2020).
69. See id; Madsen et al., Backlash Against International Courts, supra note 6, at 201 (stating IC’s
can adopt particular strategies to respond to backlash and this is influenced by different constellations of
actors).
70. See Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty?”: European Governments and the
European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 135–42 (1998) (discussing numerous failed attempts
against the Court of Justice of the European Union). See generally, Karen J. Alter, Establishing the
Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (2003) (expanding
on examples discussed in her earlier article). A more recent example is the attempt by the Danish
government to push back against the ECtHR in 2017 and 2018 with the goal of regaining political and
sovereign control over policy-areas they argued were of critical political importance with regard to
migration. This push was met with a counter-mobilization involving both other member states and civil
society, resulting in a much revised and subdued reform proposal, the Copenhagen Declaration. See
Madsen, supra note 36 (analyzing the Danish example at length throughout); Alter et al., Backlash
Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa, supra note 6, at 216 (discussing the same
issue of countermobilization against challenges to ICs in African sub-regional courts).
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V
OUTLINE OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE
This Part previews the studies included in this special issue, focusing on how
they engage the concept of mega-politics as reframed in this introduction. Each
set of contributors to this special issue was asked to select a mega-political topic
to consider, to explain why the issue was mega-political, and to choose a specific
focus. The scope of the inquiry is national, transnational, and international. The
case-studies are written by an interdisciplinary group of experts of international
courts and generally involve both junior and senior scholars.
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Michael Blauberger’s article “The Court of
Justice of the European Union and the Mega-Politics of Posted Workers”
examines the hotly contested issue of the labor rights of workers from one
European country who are temporarily employed in another European country.71
The authors explain that this issue generated problems based on the differential
labor and social regulations of member states, putting rules on the freedom of
services in a collision course with labor regulations, which many member states
see as falling within their sovereign prerogative. Through a provocative analysis
of newspaper coverage of the political debates and Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) legal rulings in five countries from 2000-2020, the
authors find that the issue was already politicized before the CJEU ruled, in large
part because European enlargement disrupted a careful political balance
achieved among pre-enlargement member states. They argue that the CJEU first
tried to rebalance the diverse interests, issuing rulings that proved highly
controversial. It then stepped back, parsing the responsibility for determining the
relevant rights to implicated states. The authors process-trace the interaction of
CJEU rulings with different political attempts to resolve the conflict legislatively.
The judicial-legislative interaction, although controversial, ultimately helped to
quiet tempers, and the authors see the CJEU as crucial in helping to craft a
workable solution. The overall finding is that while the CJEU’s “Laval quartet”
rulings became a lightning rod of contestation, the heart of the problem came
from conflicts of law, not the CJEU per se. By trying to help craft solutions, and
later deferring to member state solutions, the CJEU both weathered the storm
and helped to right the ship.
Silvia Steininger and Nicole Deitelhoff’s article “Against the Masters of War:
The Overlooked Functions of Conflict Litigation by International Courts”
examines adjudication of violent conflict in various guises and legal venues.72
Focused on the mega-politics involved in adjudicating these cases, the authors
argue that one cannot say that international judicial intervention is harmful to
the goals of democracy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, or the legal norms in
question. Even if the parties ignore the ruling or use it to rally their forces, the
authors argue that judicial involvement has clearly been helpful for instantiating
71. Martinsen & Blauberger, supra note 24.
72. Steininger & Deitelhoff, supra note 37.
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what this introduction has called the intermediate and extensive authority of ICs
and of the law in question. Moreover, when litigation is embraced by both sides,
judicialization buys time, interjects legal concerns, and creates a space and
process for partisans to work out their differences. Even in cases where the
various sides reject and capitalize on litigation for their own purposes, the authors
reject the validity of a counterfactual analysis of what might have been had the
IC not become involved. History cannot be rewritten, they argue, especially when
the subject is war. Litigation will neither win nor end the war, but the
development of law and legal processes can contribute to less violence and the
peaceful resolution of disputes.
Laurence Helfer and Clare Ryan’s contribution “LGBT Rights as MegaPolitics: Litigating Before the ECtHR” examines the evolution of lesbian and gay
rights litigation before the ECtHR.73 Using new empirical data, they show that
the rights of sexual minorities have increasingly been politicized in recent years,
and that this politicization is likely to be a feature of future ECtHR cases.
Although most of the early controversies involving LGBT rights have become
settled in many European countries and are thus no longer mega-political, Helfer
and Ryan show how both old and new LGBT right controversies have emerged
as mega-political issues in other European countries and before the ECtHR. The
authors suggest that recent expansions of ECtHR case law, particularly in the
area of same-sex families and asylum, are likely to further politicize LGBT rights
litigation before the Strasbourg Court. They provide concrete examples of how
the combination of deep social cleavages over LGBT rights in some member
states and sovereignty driven politics have fueled the re-politicization of LGBT
rights as a mega-political issue—yet only for some countries and with respect to
some issues. The mega-politics of LGBT rights is, in other words, highly variable
across Europe and with respect to the specific issue involved, so that one
increasingly finds different states pitched against each other on these issues.
James Thuo Gathii and Olabisi Akinkube’s article “Judicialization of
Election Disputes in Africa’s International Courts” explores the practice of
candidates disputing electoral outcomes in front of regional ICs, even when the
IC’s jurisdiction for doing so is questionable or non-existent.74 Litigants turn to
ICs because domestic courts tend to ratify the election of incumbents,
contributing to the “hegemonic preservation of incumbents.” The cases they
examine were sometimes adjudicated domestically, sometimes internationally,
and sometimes in both venues. The authors are mostly interested in why litigants
chose to judicialize the dispute. While the plaintiffs sometimes win legal victories
that validate some of their arguments, they do not manage to reverse the electoral
outcome. Litigants pursue cases, knowing they will lose, because doing so draws
domestic and international attention to their complaints. Given that elections will
reoccur, the goal is to draw greater scrutiny for the next election. As the elections
are nationally validated, and IC rulings in these cases are generally ignored, the
73. Helfer & Ryan, supra note 27.
74. Gathii & Akinkugbe, supra note 25.
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legal reviews are not politically disruptive. Whether the additional scrutiny
proves helpful is beyond the scope of the analysis, but the authors observe an
emboldening of national court rulings to the point that important national
elections were eventually overturned because of election irregularities.
Salvatore Caserta and Pola Cebulak in “Territorial Disputes by Proxy: The
Indirect Involvement of International Courts in the Megapolitics of Territory”
examines an obvious candidate for mega-political disputes: contested
delineations of territory between states.75 The authors focus on how these
territorial disputes sometimes reach ICs indirectly. More specifically, the article
focuses on how regional courts set up to mainly adjudicate economic or human
rights matters have increasingly been faced with such indirect territorial disputes.
Since these regional courts have compulsory jurisdiction and allow private
litigants access, they have created the pathway that different segments of litigants
can use to contest territorial claims. Focusing on territorial cases before the
Central American Court of Justice, CJEU and the ECtHR, the authors explore
how these cases, and the discussion of these cases, is different from the literature
on the ICJ’s inter-state adjudication of territorial disputes. ICJ cases are generally
consensual, and studies find that judicial intervention can help find peaceful
resolution to conflicts. The lack of state consent for regional territorial dispute
resolution by proxy contributes to more mixed results. In some instances, the
intervention of regional judges has exacerbated the underlying inter-state
conflict, while in others, regional courts have contributed to stabilizing the
conflict and reframing public discourse from being centered on national interest
to focusing on individual rights.
Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Edoardo Stoppioni’s article “Jus Cogens Before
International Courts: The Mega-Political Side of the Story” considers how the
legal category of jus cogens generates inter-state conflicts.76 While jus cogens is
generally understood as a set of fundamental and overriding principles of
international law that provide peremptory norms for the international system,
the substantive contents of jus cogens norms and their precise value as legal
sources are deeply contested. This contest over jus cogens is largely driven by
sovereignty claims. This contested category of international law was originally
framed as a dispute over Western conceptions of international law against nonaligned and socialist states at the advent of decolonization. More recently,
however, Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL) have invested
in jus cogens as an emancipatory legal tool against the continuous Western
dominance of international law. The authors show how this conflict remains
unresolved in international law and that international judges continue to oscillate
between a conservative and a progressive stance on jus cogens. Using a more
normative TWAIL perspective, the authors argue that jus cogens offers an
overlooked procedural potential, and particularly for those who have been
reduced to subalterns of the international system.
75. Caserta & Cebulak, supra note 21.
76. Ruiz Fabri & Stoppioni, supra note 38.
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Karen J. Alter and Mikael Rask Madsen’s conclusion to this special issue,
“Beyond Backlash: The Consequences of Adjudicating Mega-Politics,” examines
the implications of adjudicating mega-politics for politics, for society, for the case
at hand, and for the ICs involved.77 The authors draw on the findings of the
special issue contributions, identifying the many strategies that ICs use to rule on
the issue without inciting a political backlash. The conclusion also develops
further the claim that adjudicating mega-political disputes need not be
democracy undermining. The analysis ends up questioning whether society
should be worried about ICs adjudicating mega-political disputes. The cautiously
salutary findings do not mean that all involved should welcome more
adjudication of mega-political disputes. It is always better for stakeholders to
resolve their disputes themselves, so long as minority and vulnerable individuals
and groups are not thrown under the bus in the process. These findings do,
however, mean that the international adjudication of mega-politics, while deeply
frustrating for political leaders who would prefer to ignore international law, is
perhaps not something that should be avoided wherever possible. Circling back
to Ran Hirschl’s concern about juristocracy, the overall finding is that
international judicial review need not contribute to juristocracy. Instead,
international legal review of mega-political cases may be a limited but
nonetheless consequential fail-safe against the alternative of unfettered and
unquestioned actions and interpretations of international law, rendering
international law a rule-by-law tool of heads of state.

77. Karen J. Alter & Mikael Rask Madsen, Beyond Backlash: The Consequences of Adjudicating
Mega-Politics, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 2021, at 219.

